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Abstract
We study the effects of minimum capital requirements, capital buffers, liquidity regulation
and loan loss provisions on the incentives of bankers to exert effort and take excessive risk.
These regulations impact differently the behavior of bankers. Capital regulation, liquid-
ity requirements and traditional loan loss provisions for expected losses provide adequate
incentives to bankers. Capital requirements are the most powerful instrument. Counter-
cyclical (so-called dynamic) loan loss provisions may provide bankers with incentives to
gamble. The results help informing the ongoing debate about the harmonization of banking
regulation and the implementation of Basel III.
Keywords Banking regulation · Minimum capital requirement · Capital buffer · Liquidity
requirement · (Counter-cyclical) loan loss provision · Bankers’ incentives · Effort · Risk
JEL Classiﬁcation G21 · G28
1 Introduction
In recent years the trend towards the harmonization of financial regulation has gained
momentum. New regulation is being introduced with the aim of avoiding regulatory arbi-
trage and making financial institutions safer and more resilient to shocks. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, for instance, promulgated a new version of its Accord
(called Basel III) determining higher minimum capital requirements for banks and the con-
ditions under which they should build extra capital buffers, such as the conservation and
the counter-cyclical ones, as well as enhanced liquidity requirements. In the same spirit,
accounting bodies (e.g. the International Financial Reporting Standards) have been revising
the rules for the recognition of loan losses with the objective of achieving a timelier and
more adequate loan loss provision system.
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The primary objective of Basel III is to build buffers in order to achieve the broader
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from expansionary periods that have
often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk. While the introduction of this
regulation may have positive outcomes, it might also have unintended consequences. A key
criterion to identify the case for policy intervention is the presence of systemic negative
externalities. In general, such externalities arise whenever the costs of failed endeavors are
not only borne by those who stood to benefit from the initial risk-taking activity, but also
spill over to the wider financial sector and economy. Though they have macroeconomic
consequences, these externalities typically originate from misaligned incentives at a microe-
conomic level, e.g. pervasive moral hazard that induces agents into excessive risk-taking in
their contractual relations. Not all such market failures are relevant for financial stability,
but insofar as they aggregate up to a systemic level they may become relevant. Hence, it
is important to understand the impact of regulation on banker’s incentives because it will
determine whether regulation would help to lean against the build-up of risk (a secondary
objective of Basel III) or have the opposite unintended effect.
The implementation of Basel III is also matter of debate in several jurisdictions. Banking
systems around the world show key differences, which in turn have justified the enact-
ment of different banking regulations.1 For example, several countries (e.g. Spain, Peru and
Uruguay) introduced counter-cyclical loan loss provision regulation (also called dynamic
or statistical provisions) long before the Basel’s III counter-cyclical capital buffer proposal.
Recently, Spain stops using dynamic provisions in order to implement a counter-cyclical
capital buffer. Should regulators prefer the use of one instrument over the other?
This paper aims to inform the ongoing debate by analyzing how different bank regu-
lations affect bankers’ incentives to exert effort in monitoring loans and to take excessive
risk by shifting to risky projects. More precisely, we propose a formal model, based on
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and inspired by Biais and Casamatta (1999), to investigate
the effects of four different banking regulations: (i) minimum capital requirements, (ii) cap-
ital buffers, (iii) liquidity requirements, (iv) loan loss provisions for expected losses and
counter-cyclical provisions.
We find that regulations impact differently the behavior of bankers. We characterize
conditions under which they make it easier to implement the first-best solution. The require-
ment of a capital buffer facilitates the provision of the correct incentives to bankers. Capital
buffers are the most powerful among the policy options that are analyzed: requiring extra
capital is a direct mechanism to increase the participation of the banker on the bank so
as to mitigate the moral hazard problems. When the capital buffer is financed by external
investors, it also makes it easier to provide the correct incentives to bankers because the
capital buffer relaxes the participation constraint of depositors. Moreover, the equity con-
tract with external investors improves efficiency in financing making it easier to provide
the right incentives to bankers. Liquidity requirements also make it easier to provide the
correct incentives to bankers, but they are a less powerful instrument than capital regula-
tion. The reason for this is that capital requirements affect the funding structure of the bank
(the liability side of the balance sheet) but liquidity requirements affect the structure of the
investment (the asset side) restricting the possibility of investing the requirement in more
productive opportunities. This result is also valid for the case of traditional provision sys-
tems for expected loan losses. The accumulation of a counter-cyclical loan loss provision
1According to Ayadi et al. (2015), there is no evidence that any common set of best practices is universally
appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks. Regulatory structures that will succeed in some countries
may not constitute best practice in other countries that have different institutional settings.
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fund, however, makes it more difficult to provide the correct incentives to bankers. Since
part of the loan portfolio’s returns needs to be put on reserve, the fraction left available to
compensate the banker is reduced in such a way that she may get incentives to gamble by
taking more risks and shirking.
Our results shed light on the complementarity of implementing a counter-cyclical capital
buffer for banks in countries already running counter-cyclical loan loss provision systems.
Capital buffers and traditional provisions for expected loan losses (which works as a reserve
requirement) provide adequate incentives to bankers, the former being a more powerful
instrument than the latter. However, counter-cyclical loan loss provision regulation may
provide bankers with incentives to gamble in periods when the fund is accumulating (i.e. in
good times). Hence, in good times bank supervisors should either prefer the use of capital
buffers like the proposed in Basel III, or complement counter-cyclical loan loss provisions
with higher minimum capital requirements and stronger supervision of risk-taking activities.
In the next section, we revise related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the basic
model and derive the benchmark case. In Section 4, we analyze the impact of introducing
different kind of regulatory tools on banker’s incentives, compare the results, and link them
to empirical evidence. In Section 5, we make final comments. Proof of the main propositions
and other technicalities are in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
This paper contributes to the ever-growing literature on banking regulation by consider-
ing the effects of different tools currently used for prudential regulation on the incentives
of bankers. Managers’ incentives are particularly relevant in banking because asymmetric
information determines that, in addition to the traditional effort problem, another moral haz-
ard problem is likely to exist under the form of risk shifting. Hence, the outcome of the
same prudential regulation may be very different when one considers these moral hazard
problems as, for example, Arango and Valencia (2015) have highlighted.
One strand of the banking regulation literature has focused on microeconomic aspects
by analyzing the optimal bank’s funding structure. In general, it looks for optimal financial
contracts in presence of the two moral hazard problems described previously, i.e. effort and
risk-shifting. When dealing exclusively with the effort problem, debt contracts arise as the
optimal ones (see, for example, Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Diamond and Rajan 2001; and
Diamond and Rajan 2012). The reason is that short-term debt acts as a threat to bankers: if
they do not diligently manage the loan portfolio, then debt holders would not roll over their
financing. Hence, debt contracts are needed in order to impose some market discipline to
bankers.
In dealing exclusively with the risk-shifting problem, Bolton et al. (2015) develop a
model that includes shareholders, debtholders, depositors and bankers in order to capture
the risk-taking incentives of each of these players. Equity contracts arise as the optimal ones
(see also Admati et al. 2013 and the references therein). The reason for this is that once
debt is in place, bankers (and also shareholders) have incentives to take excessive risk at the
expense of creditors: creditors do not benefit from the high returns in the event of success
but they are burdened with the increased cost in the event of default. Feess and Hege (2012)
find that capital requirements differentiated according to the bank size are good instruments
to deal with the risk-shifting problem.
Acharya et al. (2012, 2014) and Hellwig (2009) consider both moral hazard problems
simultaneously. In all these papers debt and equity pose a trade-off for regulators: debt is
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good for monitoring incentives while equity is good for prudent investment. Hence, the
prescription of these models is to require banks hybrid funding contracts. Our work also
consider both moral hazard problems simultaneously and assume that banker’s incentives
are linked to shareholders’ value as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). We contribute to the
previously mentioned strand of the literature by analyzing the impact that different banking
regulations have on the implementation of the first best optimal solution via the incentives
that they provide to bankers.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the design of macro-prudential policies and
looks for mechanisms that minimize the frequency and cost of systemic failures (see, for
example, Galati and Moessner 2011, for a review). This strand of the literature has pointed
out that capital requirements may add procyclicality (Benigno 2013; Brunnermeier et al.
2009; Hanson et al. 2011; Repullo and Suarez 2013), and several policy options have been
proposed to tackle this problem. For example, Repullo et al. (2010) propose cyclically
adjusted capital requirements; Allen and Carletti (2013) suggest the use of counter-cyclical
capital ratios and loan loss provisions; the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
(2009) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) recommend the construc-
tion of capital buffers during economic booms; Burroni et al. (2009) suggest the use of
counter-cyclical loan loss provisions. Although these policies may be useful to generate
buffers during booms that could help to absorb losses during down-turns, the aforemen-
tioned papers do not explicitly consider the effects of regulatory policies on bankers’
risk-taking and monitoring incentives. We focus on the study of these effects, which may be
relevant for financial stability as they may channel misaligned incentives into externalities
up to a systemic level.
3 The basic model
3.1 Set up
We consider the following extension of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) inspired by Biais
and Casamatta (1999). There are two types of risk neutral investors: bankers and external
investors.
Bankers. There is a continuum of bankers. Each banker is endowed with initial equity E
and the ability to manage a bank. A bank may be visualized as a portfolio of loans L > E.
The bankers’ equity may serve as inside financing to the bank. In order to complete the
financing of the loan portfolio, bankers need to raise funds from external investors. The
loan portfolio yields a return Rθ , which is contingent on the state of the world θ and
perfectly verifiable ex post. For simplicity, we assume that there are three states of the
world, θ ∈ {u,m, d}, with corresponding returns: Ru > Rm > L > Rd .2 In order to
keep things in the simplest way and without loss of generality we normalize Rd to zero.
The probability distribution of portfolio returns is affected by bankers’ decisions, which
are not observable by third parties.
External investors. There is a continuum of external investors with excess of funds but
without the ability to directly invest in a portfolio of loans. They could provide outside
financing to the bank or invest in an alternative project with a rate of return r . In the basic
2This is the simplest setting in which one could capture the bankers’ two dimensional moral hazard problem
and extract general results about the impact of regulation on bankers’ incentives.
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model, we consider exclusively depositors as external investors. A particular feature of
depositors is that they are small and non-sophisticated agents without the incentive or the
capacity to monitor bankers. This feature has some implications that help to simplify our
analysis. First, we assume that depositors use only deposit contracts with a face value,
D ≤ Rm. Second, following Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) we consider that depositors
are represented by some banking authority. In the next section, we also consider cases in
which sophisticated investors may provide funding to the bank through equity contracts
that promise a participation in bank’s revenue.
Moral hazard. In the same spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976), we consider that there
are two sources of moral hazard. First, each banker chooses the level of effort to exert in
detecting good investment opportunities. Exerting effort is privately costly for the banker
but it improves the distribution of portfolio returns in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. We denote by B the banker’s cost of exerting effort (or equivalently the
utility from shirking). Second, each banker chooses the riskiness of the portfolio. Taking
more risk leads to a deterioration of the distribution of portfolio returns in the sense of
second-order stochastic dominance.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that a banker can choose
between two levels of risk and two levels of effort. Consider the case in which the banker
does not take excessive risk. If she does not exert effort, then we assume that the three
states of nature are equally probable. If she exerts effort, however, the distribution of
portfolio returns improves in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. More pre-
cisely, the probability of the good state (θ = u) increases by  and the probability of the
bad state (θ = d) decreases by . Denote by V the expected outcome under effort and
by V the expected outcome when shirking. To further simplify the analysis, we assume
that the project has positive net present value (NPV) only if the banker exerts effort and
that effort is socially optimal: V > V + B. If a banker switches to riskier projects, the
probability of the medium state (θ = m) is reduced by α +β, the probability of the good
state (θ = u) is increased by α and that of the bad state (θ = d) by β. We assume that
this riskier distribution is dominated in the sense of second order stochastic dominance,
which is equivalent to: α (Ru − Rm) < βRm. Under this assumption the NPV of the
bank’s loan portfolio is reduced by risk-taking.
First best. Since the NPV of the bank is positive only if the banker exerts effort, which is
socially optimal, and excessive risk taking reduces the NPV, then the first best solution
is clearly characterized by effort and no risk-taking.
Regulation. In order to allow banks to operate, a banking authority may request that they
fulfill some regulations. We will consider the cases of minimum capital requirements,
extra capital requirements (e.g. buffers like in Basel III), liquidity requirements and loan
loss provisions.
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows. Bankers raise funds from external investors
and invest these funds together with their own internal equity in a portfolio of loans. At
this point, they decide whether to take excessive risk or not and the effort they exert in
looking for investment opportunities. At the end of the period, loan portfolio returns are
realized and the outcome distributed between the banker and depositors.
3.2 Benchmark case: minimum capital requirement
We first analyze the benchmark case in which the banking authority requires a minimum
level of capital to bankers in order to raise deposits and operate the bank. More precisely, we
derive the minimum capital requirement that makes the first best solution attainable. Since
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in the first best solution the banker should choose to exert effort and to abstain from taking
excessive risk, then the two following incentive compatibility conditions must hold. First,
when the banker does not take excessive risk she should also exert effort:
(1/3 + )(Ru − D) + 1/3(Rm − D) ≥ 1/3(Ru − D) + 1/3(Rm − D) + B. (1)
The left-hand side of Eq. 1 is the expected return of the banker, after paying depositors the
face value of their deposits, D, when she refrains from taking risk and exerts effort. The
right-hand side is the sum of her expected return when she shirks and the benefit she gets
from shirking.
Second, when the banker exerts effort, she should also refrain from taking excessive risk:
(1/3+)(Ru−D)+1/3(Rm−D) ≥ (1/3++α)(Ru−D)+(1/3−α−β)(Rm−D). (2)
The left-hand side of Eq. 2 is the expected return of the banker when she exerts effort and
abstains from excessive risk taking, while the right-hand side is the sum of her expected
return when she exerts effort but takes excessive risk.
A third constraint would be considered to ensure that the banker prefers to exert
effort and to abstain from risk taking rather than shirking and taking excessive risk. It is
straightforward to show that such a constraint is redundant given Eqs. 1 and 2.
The participation constraint of depositors is:
(2/3 + )D ≥ (L − E)(1 + r). (3)
It is not hard to show that the participation constraint of the banker is always satisfied
under the assumption that the portfolio of loans has positive NPV (see Appendix A).
Notice that Eqs. 1 and 2 provide two upper bounds for the amount of money depositors
can get in exchange of investing L − E:
D ≤ Ru − B

, and (4)
D ≤ (α + β)R
m − αRu
β
. (5)
There is another bound for D resulting from our assumption on deposit contracts, i.e.
D ≤ Rm. This bound, however, is redundant given Eq. 5. Without loss of generality we
can assume that Eq. 3 is binding, from where we get that D = (L−E)(1+r)2/3+ . Combining this
expression with the two bounds in Eqs. 4 and 5, and after some algebraic manipulation the
following inequality arises:
E ≥ E0 ≡ L − 2/3 + 
1 + r min
[
Ru − B

,
(α + β)Rm − αRu
β
]
. (6)
When Eq. 6 holds the bank can be financed with deposits and the first best solution attained.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 1 A positive NPV bank can be financed exclusively with deposits and the first
best solution is attained if the initial equity of bankers (E) is larger than the minimum
capital requirement E0 defined in Eq. 6.
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Proposition 1 states that the initial equity of the banker (E) must be larger than a min-
imum level (E0) for the loan portfolio to be financed by depositors; i.e. the banker needs
to fulfill a minimum capital requirement. In other words, given the moral hazard prob-
lems, depositors require some skin of the banker on the portfolio of loans. When E is large
enough, the return required by depositors to participate leaves enough return to compen-
sate the banker in such a way that she gets the incentive to exert effort and to abstain from
excessive risk taking.
4 Regulation and bankers’ incentives
In this section, we analyze how the introduction of different regulatory tools currently used
by banking authorities impact banker’s incentives. In particular, we focus on three different
policies: extra capital requirements (so-called capital reserves or capital buffers), liquidity
requirements and loan loss provisions.
4.1 Extra capital requirements
Under Basel III regulation, banks are required to build extra capital buffers, such as the
conservation and the counter-cyclical buffers. These buffers are designed to ensure that
banks build up an additional loss-absorbing capital cushion outside periods of stress, which
can be drawn down as losses are incurred. A secondary objective of the buffer regime is that
they help to lean against the build-up of excessive risk-taking in the first place. In this regard,
the impact of regulation on the incentives of bankers to excert effort and take excessive risk
become relevant. We study this issue here.
Consider the case in which regulation takes the form of an additional capital buffer P
on top the minimum capital requirement. More precisely, we analyze the situation in which
banking authorities decide to increase the level of equity capital in order to build a buffer
against future losses. This additional capital requirement affects the bank’s funding struc-
ture.3 The extra capital buffer needs to be financed either by the banker or by external
investors other than depositors.
Financedby thebanker We analyze first the case in which the extra capital buffer is funded
by the banker. In such a case, the new requirement affects incentives in the following way.
First, the participation constraint of depositors becomes softer because their participation in
the funding of the bank is smaller than in the benchmark case:
(2/3 + )D ≥ (L − E − P)(1 + r). (7)
Second, it is not difficult to see that the incentive compatibility constraints of the banker
remain unchanged with the introduction of the additional capital requirements, i.e. Eqs. 1
and 2 hold. Third, since the additional capital requirement is funded by the banker, her par-
ticipation constraint becomes tighter than in the benchmark case. However, it is not difficult
to show that the banker will be willing to participate as long as the net present value of the
bank is positive.
3It is important to notice that capital regulation does not affect what assets banks invest in or hold, neither
it requires setting aside funds and not investing them productively. See Admati et al. (2013) for a detailed
discussion about bank equity and capital regulation.
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Working out the previous constraints, the following Proposition summarizes the con-
ditions under which a bank can be financed by depositors when an additional capital
requirement is required to bankers.
Proposition 2 Assume that capital regulation takes the form of a capital buffer P which is
financed by bankers. Then the first best solution can be attained and a positive NPV bank
can be funded with deposit with a minimum capital requirement E1:
E1 ≡ E0 − P . (8)
The introduction of a capital buffer enlarges the set of bankers for which the first best
solution can be attained with respect to the benchmark case, i.e. E1 < E0. Requiring extra
capital is a direct mechanism to increase the stake of the banker on the bank and then it
mitigates the moral hazard problems. In this sense, capital buffer regulation makes it easier
to provide the correct incentives to bankers. Moreover, capital buffers are as powerful as
minimum capital requirements for motivating the banker to exert effort and refrain from
excessive risk taking.
Financedby sophisticated, external investors We analyze next the case in which the addi-
tional capital requirement is funded by sophisticated, external investors operating through
financial markets. Assume that external investors provide the extra funds P in exchange of
a participation in banks’ revenues. Let δu and δm be the share of revenue earned by external
investors in states u and m, respectively. This new funding structure changes the banker’s
incentive compatibility conditions (Eqs. 1 and 2) in the following way. First, the banker
prefers to exert effort and to abstain from taking excessive risk, instead of not exerting effort
and abstain from taking excessive risk if:
(1/3 + )(1 − δu)(Ru − D) + 1/3(1 − δm)(Rm − D)
≥ 1/3(1 − δu)(Ru − D) + 1/3(1 − δm)(Rm − D) + B. (9)
Second, the banker prefers to exert effort and to abstain from taking excessive risk,
instead of exerting effort and taking excessive risk, if the following condition holds:
(1/3 + )(1 − δu)(Ru − D) + 1/3(1 − δm)(Rm − D)
≥ (1/3 +  + α)(1 − δu)(Ru − D) + (1/3 − α − β)(1 − δm)(Rm − D). (10)
Additional capital requirements makes depositors’ participation constraint softer (Eq. 7
holds) and introduces the participation constraint of external investors. External investors
will be willing to invest in the bank if and only if the following condition holds:
(1/3 + )δu(Ru − D) + 1/3δm(Rm − D) ≥ P(1 + r). (11)
As it is shown in the Appendix, the system made up of Eqs. 9 to 11 put thresholds in the
amount of deposits the bank can raise. Combining these thresholds with the participation
constraint given by Eq. 7 we get that a bank can be funded by depositors and external
investors if the level of internal equity is high enough. We summarize the result in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that capital regulation takes the form of a capital buffer P which is
financed by external investors. Then the first best solution can be attained and a positive
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NPV bank can be funded with deposits if the initial equity of bankers (E) is larger than the
minimum capital requirement E2:
E ≥ E2 ≡ L − P − 2/3 + 
1 + r min[U,V],where
U ≡ (α + β)R
m − αRu + αP (1 + r)
(1/3 + )β , and
V ≡ 1/3R
m + (1/3 + )Ru − [(1/3 + ) + 1/3 α
α+β ]B − P(1 + r)
2/3 +  . (12)
Proof See Appendix B.
The comparison between the level of equity required to implement the first best solution
when additional capital is funded by external investors and the benchmark case depends on
the prevailing moral hazard problem. For the sake of exposition, we focus on the two cases
separately.
When the risk-taking is the dominant moral hazard problem, the first best solution can be
attained if Eqs. 7, 10 and 11 hold, which imply that U < V in Eq. 12. Hence, the first-best
can be implemented when the level of internal equity is higher than the threshold Erisk2 :
E ≥ Erisk2 ≡ L − P −
2/3 + 
1 + r U. (13)
When risk-taking is the dominant moral hazard problem, the benchmark minimum
capital requirement derived in Eq. 6 becomes:
E ≥ Erisk0 ≡ L −
2/3 + 
1 + r
(α + β)Rm − αRu
β
. (14)
The comparison between the minimum capital requirements Erisk2 and E
risk
0 is estab-
lished by the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that capital regulation takes the form of a capital buffer P which is
financed by external investors and that risk-taking is the dominant moral hazard problem.
Then the minimum level of banker’s equity that implements the first best solution is:
Erisk2 = Erisk0 − P
[
1 + α
β
2/3 + 
1/3 + 
]
. (15)
Proof See Appendix B.
Figure 1 presents the relationship between Erisk2 and E
risk
0 , as well as the comparison
with the case in which the capital buffer is financed by bankers, E1. Both minimum capital
requirements increase in the magnitude of the risk-taking problem, which is measured by
α. However, they increase less than proportionally than the risk-taking problem, i.e. Erisk0
and Erisk2 are concave in α (see Appendix B). To see the intuition for this result consider
the case of Erisk0 . If risk-shifting is a more important problem, i.e. when α increases, then
the implementation of the first-best requires that bankers put more equity into the bank, i.e.
∂Erisk0 /∂α is positive and linear in α. But, if α increases, then β must also increase so that
the resulting distribution of probabilities is second-order stochastically dominated by the
previous one. The increase in the probability of the failure state by β, with the symmetric
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Fig. 1 Minimum capital
requirement when risk-taking is
the dominant moral hazard
problem: Erisk0 for the
benchmark case, Erisk2 for the
case with a capital buffer
financed by external investors,
and E1 for the case with a capital
buffer financed by bankers. Note:
these draws assume that β
increases less than proportionally
to an increase in α
reduction in the probability of the medium state, moderates the banker’s willingness for
taking excessive risk. In turn, this reduces the need for bankers’ equity in order to restore
incentives, partially compensating the former effect.
The introduction of a capital buffer that is financed by external investors enlarges the set
of bankers for which the first-best solution can be attained. There are two reasons behind
this result. First, as in the case in which the buffer is financed by bankers, the financing by
external investors softens the participation constraint of depositors, so that they are willing
to participate even if the banker’s equity is lower. This determines a linear reduction on the
minimum capital requierement, which is comparable to E1 in Fig. 1. Second, the issuance
of a financial contract different from bank deposits, i.e. a contract that allows for state-
contingent payoffs to investors, introduces flexibility so that the banker’s payoff can be
optimally set in such a way that it is easier to provide the correct incentives towards risk-
taking. More precisely, the optimal financial contract with external investors would reduce
the banker’s residual payoff in the upper state of the world more than proportionally than
in the medium state, i.e. δu > δm. Hence, it would be as if the bank had issued warrants
or convertible debt, e.g. CoCos, among sophisticated investors. As a result, the minimum
capital required to implement the first-best (Erisk2 ) increases less than the benchmark (E
risk
0 )
as the risk-shifting problem becomes more important, i.e. Erisk2 is more concave in α than
Erisk0 .
The results that a capital buffer enlarges the set of bankers for which the first-best solu-
tion can be attained and that the resulting minimum capital requirements are concave in
α are robust. However, the minimum capital requirements will be decreasing in α if the
increase in the probability of the failure state is large enough, i.e. when β increases more
than proportionally to α. The intuition for this result follows the same lines that we have
highlighted. From a banker’s point of view, the attractiveness for risk-shifting increases in
α (the increase in the probability of the upper state) and decreases in β (the corresponding
increase in the probability of the failure state at expense of the probability of the medium
state). If the latter effect is too harsh, then it would be easier to give bankers the correct
incentives towards excessive risk taking.
We turn now to the analysis of the case where effort is the dominant moral hazard prob-
lem and extra capital requirements are financed by external investors. In this case, the first
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best solution can be attained if Eqs. 7, 9 and 11 hold, i.e. U > V in Eq. 12. As in the pre-
vious cases, these equations imply bounds on the amount of deposits that can be raised by
banks. In turn, this implies a minimum capital requirement Eeff ort2 :
E ≥ Eeff ort2 ≡ L −
1
1 + r min
[
(1/3 + )Ru + 1/3Rm − (1/3 + )B

;Rm(2/3 + )
]
.
(16)
Considering that effort is the dominant problem, the benchmark minimum capital
requirement derived in Eq. 6 becomes:
E ≥ Eeff ort0 ≡ L −
2/3 + 
1 + r min
[
Ru − B

;Rm
]
. (17)
The comparison between the minimum capital requirements Eeff ort2 and E
eff ort
0 is
established by the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that capital regulation takes the form of a capital buffer P which is
financed by external investors and that effort is the dominant moral hazard problem. Then
the minimum level of equity that implements the first best solution is:
E
eff ort
2 =
{
E
eff ort
0 if
B

≤ Ru − Rm
E
eff ort
0 − 1/3+1+r (Ru − Rm − B ) if Ru − Rm ≤ B
. (18)
Proof See Appendix B.
As it is shown in Fig. 2, both minimum capital requirements are non-decreasing in the
magnitude of the effort problem, which is measured by B

. When effort is the only moral
hazard problem, then the level of internal equity required to the banker in order to implement
the first best solution is lower if the bank receives financing which is provided by external
investors. The intuition for this result is the same than in the risk-taking case. The financing
by external investors softens the participation constraint of depositors and allows flexibility
to the financial contract with the banker such that it becomes easier to provide the correct
incentives. In this case, an optimal financing arrangement may involve making the banker’s
payoff even more convex than what equity implies, which would be achieved by setting
δu < δm, as if the banker owned stock options on the bank.
4.2 Liquidity requirement
The financial crisis 2007–2009 had a harmful effect through global liquidity shortages. The
introduction of the Basel’s III liquidity coverage ratio aims to promote the resilience of the
liquidity risk profile of banks. It does this by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock
of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets that can be converted easily and immediately in
private markets into cash to meet their liquidity needs.
In this subsection, we model this feature by considering the case in which regulation
imposes a liquidity requirement P . Liquidity requirements must be kept aside in order
for the bank to be authorized to operate. In this case, the total investment on the bank is
L+P , i.e. the portfolio of loans plus the liquidity requirement. We assume that the liquidity
requirement is financed by the banker. The liquidity requirement affects the optimal contract
because of their effects on the distribution of portfolio returns between bankers and deposi-
tors: the latter will now receive a payment coming from the reserve fund even in the case that
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Fig. 2 Minimum capital
requirement when effort is the
dominant moral hazard problem:
E
eff ort
0 for the benchmark case,
E
eff ort
2 for the case with a
capital buffer
the state of nature is bad (θ = d). Hence, the participation constraint of depositors is:
(2/3 + )D + (1/3 − )P ≥ (L − E)(1 + r). (19)
The left-hand side of Eq. 19 is the expected return accruing to depositors when the
banker exerts effort and abstains from excessive risk taking, while the right-hand side is the
amount of funds raised from depositors plus its opportunity cost. The following Proposition
summarizes the effect of liquidity requirements on banker’s incentives.
Proposition 6 Assume that regulation takes the form of a liquidity requirement P . Then the
first best solution can be attained and a positive NPV bank can be financed with deposits if
the initial equity of bankers (E) is larger than the minimum capital requirement E3:
E ≥ E3 ≡ E0 − P
(
1/3 − 
1 + r
)
. (20)
As in the case of capital buffer regulation, liquidity requirement regulation relaxes the
participation constraint of depositors so that they require a lower proportion of the return
from the portfolio of loans. In turn, a higher proportion of the return is accruing to the banker
who now receives stronger incentives to exert effort and to refrain from taking excessive
risk. In this sense, liquidity requirements make it easier to provide the correct incentives to
the banker: E3 < E0. However, since the liquidity requirement needs to be put aside and
cannot be invested in loans, it introduces inefficiencies. As a result, this instrument is less
powerful than a capital buffer, i.e. E1 < E3.4
4.3 Loan loss provision
The traditional loan loss provision system consists in anticipating the expected losses due
to non-repayment of loans and accounting them as a reduction to the loan’s face value. At
maturity, if the loan is repaid the provision is released but if it is not the provision covers
(part of) the losses. Other things equal, a loan loss provision for expected losses affects the
4Notice that the introduction of reserve requirements should not help finance the bank because the total
wealth that the banker would need for the arrangement to be feasible would be E3 + P > E0.
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capital of the bank at the moment the loan is granted because the loss is anticipated and
counted.
We use the following modeling shortcut to introduce loan loss provisions: when a loan L
is granted, then the banker needs equity capital E in order to provide internal financing to the
loan and also an amount P to cover the provision for loan losses, i.e. in order not to fall short
the minimum capital requirement. Assuming that P is kept in riskless assets, then a loan loss
provision for expected losses has the same effects than the reserve requirement analyzed
in the previous section. Hence, Proposition 6 holds for the case of loan loss provisions for
expected loses.
Several jurisdictions manage counter-cyclical loan loss provision systems (also called
dynamic provisions). Under counter-cyclical provisioning a fund is accumulated in periods
where the expected losses are lower than the long-run, or through-the-cycle, level of losses.
The fund is constituted and counter-cyclical provisions are not released in periods with
low default rates. In practice, it is common that bankers use current profits to build the
counter-cyclical provision fund. Hence, part of the return from the bank loans is kept aside
to build the fund, affecting the distribution of returns between bankers and depositors with
implications for the bankers’ incentives. Once the fund is accumulated, it is used to cover
losses for loan non-repayment as in the traditional loan loss provision system.
In order to keep the framework as simple as possible, we abstract from modeling the use
of the fund and focus on the accumulation phase. More precisely, we assume that in periods
where the bank loan repays, an amount P of the cash flow is accumulated to the counter-
cyclical loan loss provision fund. In this context, the optimal contract will have to satisfy
the following two incentive compatibility constraints:5
(1/3 + )(Ru − P − D) + 1/3(Rm − P − D)
≥ 1/3(Ru − P − D) + 1/3(Rm − P − D) + B (21)
and
(1/3 + )(Ru − P − D) + 1/3(Rm − P − D)
≥ (1/3 +  + α)(Ru − P − D) + (1/3 − α − β)(Rm − P − D). (22)
The participation constraint of depositors is the same as in the benchmark case (see
Eq. 3). Given this new set of constraints we are able to state the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Assume that regulation takes the form of a counter-cyclical loan loss provi-
sion and that a fund P is accumulating. Then the first best solution can be attained and a
positive NPV bank can be financed with deposits if the initial equity of bankers (E) is larger
than the minimum capital requirement E4:
E ≥ E4 ≡ E0 + P
(
2/3 + 
1 + r
)
. (23)
The impact of the accumulation of a counter-cyclical loan loss provision fund is twofold.
On the one hand, it reduces the banker expected return. This implies that bankers need to
put more skin in the business to get the right incentives to exert effort and to abstain from
excessive risk taking. On the other hand, depositors require lower returns compared to the
5For simplicity we are working under the assumption that P < Rm. Otherwise, it may be the case that the
cash flow from the return of the portfolio of loans is not enough to fulfill the provision requirement. Relaxing
this assumption does not change the qualitative results of the model but makes the algebra more complicated.
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benchmark case because they will receive something in the bad state. As a net result of these
two effects, it is necessary to increase the contribution of the banker to the financing of the
bank portfolio in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. Otherwise stated, a
proportion of bankers with initial equity between E0 and E4 fails to be financed by deposi-
tors. Hence, when the fund is accumulating, counter-cyclical loan loss provision regulation
makes it more difficult to provide the correct incentive to bankers determining that a larger
proportion of positive NPV commercial banks fail to get financing from depositors. Hence,
the accumulation of loan loss provisions needed to be complemented with higher minimum
capital requirements so that the combination of regulatory tools reestablish the incentives of
bankers.
4.4 Comparisons
To sum up, capital buffers, liquidity requirements and traditional loan loss provisions make
it easier to provide the correct incentives to the banker. However, the consequences of
implementing one or the others are not exactly the same because of their different power to
provide incentives to bankers. Thereby, capital buffers are the most powerful among these
instruments. Recall than in the benchmark case, bankers are required to put a minimum
capital of E0 because if putting less than this figure, then they will get wrong incentives to
exert effort in monitoring loans and take excessive risk. The first-best allocation of effort
and risk may be implemented with a minimum capital requirement, E3, that is lower than
the benchmark, i.e. E3 < E0, when liquidity requirements and the traditional loan loss pro-
vision system are introduced. These policy tools help to provide the correct incentives to
bankers. In turn, capital buffers outperform the latter tools. Indeed, when a capital buffer
that is financed by bankers is introduced, then the minimum capital requirement falls fur-
ther to E1 < E3 < E0. Moreover, capital buffers are stronger instruments to disciplining
bankers when they are financed by sophisticated external investors: Erisk2 < E1.
These results seem to be empirically relevant. Barth et al. (2013) examine the impli-
cations of an extensive and changing set of regulations on bank efficiency using data for
more than 4050 banks in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007. Their bank efficiency
measures are constructed to gauge the extent to which the performance of individual banks
deviates from that predicted for the “best practice”, which may be associated to our theoret-
ical first-best allocation. They find that greater capital regulation stringency is marginally
and positively associated with bank efficiency, which is in line with our prediction that
E1 < E0. Moreover, increased market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial
transparency and better external audits is positively associated with bank efficiency, which
is comparable to Erisk2 < E1 in our model. Regarding provisions, they consider this vari-
able together with others to explain the power of official supervision, which turns out to be
positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory
authorities.
Although a traditional loan loss provision for expected losses makes it easier to provide
the correct incentives to bankers, in our theoretical model counter-cyclical loan loss pro-
vision regulation makes this more difficult in times where the fund is accumulating, i.e.
E0 < E4. In this case, bankers get incentives to gamble, so that the accumulation of loan
loss provisions needed to be complemented with higher minimum capital requirements in
order to restore bankers’ incentives.
Carbo-Valverde and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2015) find empirical evidence supporting our
gambling prediction in a sample of 55 Spanish banks from 1995 to 2013. Their results sug-
gest that the counter-cyclical loan loss provision system has not prevented Spanish banks
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from employing various mechanisms for earnings management, and that there are ex-ante
incentives for banks to take more risk when the provisions are implemented. In turn, they
negatively affect loan quality and loan performance during the crisis. Moreover, these pro-
visions do not appear, by themselves, to have effectively control excessive loan growth and,
to some extent, can also be exacerbated if they are not accompanied by other risk prevention
measures such as countercyclical capital. This evidence is consistent with our predictions
and with other assessments of the effectiveness of Spanish dynamic provisions, suggesting
that while dynamic provisions may effectively reduce procyclicality and act as a buffer for
loan losses over the business cycle, they cannot prevent credit booms (e.g. Brunnermeier
et al. 2009; Balla and McKenna 2009).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose a formal model to investigate the effects of minimum capi-
tal requirements, capital buffers, liquidity requirements and loan loss provisions on the
bankers’ incentives to exert effort and take excessive risk. We characterize the conditions
under which these regulations make it easier to implement the first-best solution.
We find that capital buffers, liquidity requirements and traditional loan loss provision
regulation make it easier to provide the correct incentives to bankers. Capital buffers are
the most powerful of these instruments. By contrast, counter-cyclical loan loss provision
regulation makes it more difficult to provide the correct incentives to the banker in times
where the fund is accumulating.
The theoretical results in this paper may help informing ongoing regulatory debates.
More precisely, our results shed light on the complementary effects of implementing a
counter-cyclical capital buffer like the proposed in Basel III in countries already running
counter-cyclical loan loss provision systems (e.g. Spain, Peru and Uruguay among others).6
We find that a capital buffer is the most powerful instrument to provide adequate incen-
tives to bankers. Counter-cyclical loan loss provision regulation may provide bankers with
incentives to gamble in periods during which the fund is accumulating (i.e. in good times).
Hence, in good times bank supervisors should either prefer the use of counter-cyclical
capital buffers, or complement counter-cyclical loan loss provisions with higher minimum
capital requirements and stronger supervision of risk-taking activities.
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Appendix A: Bankers’ participation
In this appendix we derive a sufficient condition that assures the participation of the banker.
More precisely, we show that the banker is willing to participate as long as the net present
value of the bank is positive. We focus on the benchmark case. However, by following the
same steps we follow below it can also be shown that the same condition guarantees the
participation of the banker on the other cases we have considered through the paper.
The banker participation constraint is:
(1/3 + )(Ru − D) + 1/3(Rm − D) ≥ (1 + r)E. (24)
Considering that the participation constraint of depositors holds with equality (see Eq. 3)
we get:
D = (1 + r)(L − E)
2/3 +  . (25)
Substituting Eq. 25 into Eq. 24 and making computations we get that Eq. 24 holds if and
only if:
NPV ≡ V − (1 + r)L ≥ 0. (26)
Appendix B: Derivations and proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
The strategy of the proof is to determine the conditions under which there exists a pair
(δu, δm) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that Eqs. 7, 9, 10 and 11 hold. Note that there is no loss of generality
in considering the case where Eq. 11 holds with equality:
δm = P(1 + r) − (1/3 + )δ
u(Ru − D)
1/3(Rm − D) . (27)
Since δm ∈ [0, 1] we get two bounds for δu:
δu ≤ P(1 + r)
(1/3 + )(Ru − D) ≡ A, and (28)
δu ≥ P(1 + r) − 1/3(R
m − D)
(1/3 + )(Ru − D) ≡ B. (29)
Substituting the value of δm obtained in Eq. 27 into Eqs. 9 and 10 gives:
δu ≤ R
u − D − B

Ru − D ≡ C, and (30)
δu ≥ (α + β)P (1 + r) − 1/3
[
(α + β)(Rm − D) − α(Ru − D)]
[1/3α + (1/3 + )(α + β)](Ru − D) ≡ D. (31)
Therefore, there exists an admissible contract if and only if δu ∈ [max(B,D),
min(A,C)]. It is easy to show that when Eq. 11 holds, B ≤ D, which implies that Eq. 29
is redundant and only Eq. 31 is the operative constraint. We need therefore that D ≤ A and
D ≤ C, which gives raise to the following two inequalities:
D ≤ (α + β)R
m − αRu + αP (1 + r)
(1/3 + )β ≡ U, and (32)
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D ≤ 1/3R
m + (1/3 + )Ru − [(1/3 + ) + 1/3 α
α+β ]B − P(1 + r)
2/3 +  ≡ V. (33)
Considering that Eq. 7 is binding, we get the following inequality:
1 + r
2/3 +  (L − P − E) ≤ min[U,V],
which can be rewritten as:
E ≥ L − P − 2/3 + 
1 + r min[U,V].
Proof of Proposition 4
We need to determine the conditions under which there exists a pair (δu, δm) ∈ [0, 1]2 such
that Eqs. 7, 10 and 11 hold. As above, there is no loss of generality in considering the case
where Eq. 11 holds with equality, which implies that Eqs. 27, 28, 29 and 30 hold.
Therefore, there exists an admissible contract if and only if δu ∈ [D,A]. We need there-
fore that D ≤ A, which gives raise to a bound in the amount the bank must pay to depositors,
D ≤ U, where U is defined in Eq. 32. Considering that Eq. 7 binds, we get the following
inequality that completes the proof:
E ≥ L − P − 2/3 + 
1 + r U = E
risk
0 − P
[
1 + α
β
2/3 + 
1/3 + 
]
.
Derivations for Fig. 1 and robustness
The slope of Erisk0 is equal to
dErisk0
dα
= ∂E
risk
0
∂α
+ ∂E
risk
0
∂β
∂β
∂α
.
Making computations one can get
dErisk0
dα
= (2/3 + )(R
u − Rm)
(1 + r)β (1 − η) ,
where η ≡ α
β
∂β
∂α
is the proportional change on β to α, i.e. its elasticity. Erisk0 increases in α
(as shown in Fig. 1) when η < 1, and decreases otherwise. Since β always increases with
α, then
dErisk0
dα
is decreasing in α, i.e. Erisk0 is always concave.
The slope of Erisk2 is equal to
dErisk2
dα
= dE
risk
0
dα
− d
dα
[
P
(
1 + α
β
2/3 + 
1/3 + 
)]
,
which can be written as
dErisk2
dα
= dE
risk
0
dα
− (2/3 + )P
(1/3 + )β (1 − η) .
The slope of Erisk2 is smaller than the slope of E
risk
0 when η < 1, and larger otherwise.
Erisk2 is always concave.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Again, we need to determine the conditions under which there exists a pair (δu, δm) ∈
[0, 1]2 such that Eqs. 7, 9 and 11 hold. As above, there is no loss of generality in considering
the case where Eq. 11 holds as an equality, which implies that Eqs. 27, 28, 29 and 31 hold.
Therefore, there exists an admissible contract if and only if δu ∈ [B, min(A,C)]. We
need therefore that B ≤ A and B ≤ C, which implies two bounds to deposits:
D ≤ Rm, and
D ≤ (1/3 + )R
u + 1/3Rm − B

(1/3 + ) − P(1 + r)
2/3 +  .
Considering that Eq. 7 binds, we get the following inequality
E ≥ L − 1
1 + r min
[
(1/3 + )Ru + 1/3Rm − B

(1/3 + ), Rm(2/3 + )
]
.
Noticing that if effort is the dominant moral hazard problem the benchmark minimum
capital requirement is Eeff ort0 ≡ L − 2/3+1+r min[Ru − B ;Rm], the proof is completed.
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